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Introduction
The agrarian reform, taking place in Russia, is a part of the all-system economic transformations
aiming to increase the efficiency of utilization of resources. The essence of the transformations is the search for
the shortest way to an effective market-oriented economy. It was supposed in the late 80’s that the Russian
economy could be reformed in 500 days. However, almost 10 years have passed since the time the prices were
set free, and the result of the period is the gravest crisis ever experienced in the last years.
We shall try to follow the progress of the agrarian reform since 1992 by employing transitional period
indicators proposed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
1 The above
indicators were developed for the purposes of evaluation of the transitional processes in Eastern Europe, Baltic
Republics and Community of Independent States. Judging by the majority of the indicators, Russia is just in
the very beginning of the transitional period. Studying the situation in the agrarian sphere of Russia, we shall
also apply general estimates in order to compare the situation in the agrarian sector with that in Russia in
general. We intend to size up the private sector’s contribution to the gross agricultural product, view the
privatization and price liberalization processes, consider the competition and external economic policies,
estimate the financial institutions’ position and focus on the legal statutes formulated to facilitate the attraction
of investments in the agrarian sector. Our scientific analysis of the present economic situation will be
complemented by examples, which is expected to make the situation more clear and predictable for our
scientific and business partners.
1. Privatization
1.1. Privatization of Large Enterprises
As on the year 1995 the situation with large-scale privatization in Russia was rated by EBRD 3 on the
5-point scale. That means that more than 25% of the large state-owned companies’ assets had been either
privatized or put on offer. But the problems related to the corporate management of such companies still
remained.
Privatization is defined as conveyance of the state property into private possession or turning of the
lines of business formerly conducted by the state over to private business.
2
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Privatization brings along the introduction of private ownership and personification of the ownership
rights and is essential for the development of competition and anti-monopolist legislation. So, what was and is
going on in the agrarian sector of Russia beginning with 1992?
The basic features of privatization in the agrarian sector of Russia – privatization of large food
processing companies and granting of the people engaged in agricultural production with property and land
shares – were predetermined by the nature of the agrarian relations then existing in Russia. Evaluation of the
above changes from the viewpoint of agricultural production efficiency, food market and security development
will take the employment of such criteria of efficiency like the regional agricultural systems’ final produce
growth, decrease of the transaction costs and availability and sustainability of the food market.
But first of all we shall attempt to characterize the process of large-scale privatization in the agrarian
sector of Russia following the measures taken in the 90’s by using the above mentioned indicators of transition
to a market-oriented economy complemented with indicators reflecting the regional agricultural systems’
specific features.
There are about 20 thousand enterprises and associations currently operating at the Russian food
market. One third of them are large companies. In the beginning of the 90’s dominating in the sector were
state-owned companies with their 90% contribution to the gross product operating under the system of
centralized distribution of raw agricultural produce and basic food products. The latter means that every year
the higher economic council would approve the annual farm product distribution plan with little distribution
powers in relation to a limited number of minor products delegated to the regions. The prices of food products
were fixed, and the subsidies applied to keep the retail prices unchanged amounted more than one third of the
expenditure part of the budget.
Large-scale privatization in the sphere of food processing took place in the period between 1992 and
1994. The scheme of privatization applied to big food processing companies was such that the controlling
interest in the company privatized was retained by its personnel and never by the agricultural commodity
producers – suppliers of raw farm produce. As a result, the meat processing and dairy plants and other
companies of the kind started to dictate the prices of raw materials, increased their wage funds and almost gave
up making investments. This in turn led to a sharp decrease in the amounts of raw farm products delivered to
big processing plants - the agricultural producers would prefer to start up their own small processing units. The
amount of imported raw products grew.
Successful privatization in the agricultural sector takes observance of a number of general rules. First
of all investment competitions should be held with banks encouraged to take part, which would make the
process of privatization more market-oriented. A most important thing is to make the company to be privatized
as attractive as possible, strengthen the competitiveness of its products and maintain and increase its technical
potential by renewing the production equipment all along the production chain. And, finally, privatized
companies should enjoy the support of the government extended by means of secondary issues of shares,
restructuring and attraction of foreign investments.
Food producing branches are highly attractive – 11,5% of the overall amount of foreign investments in
1996. Quick turnover of capital, effective renewal of equipment and practically inexhaustible market are the
factors that can make the amount of foreign investments increase. However, the overall financial instability,
difficult political situation and still existing monopoly make investing in food production a quite risky
undertaking.
More than 50% of the large state-owned food processing companies’ assets are now privatized. The
rate of large-scale privatization in the food processing industry is thus higher than the Russian average and3
corresponds to some 4 points according to the EBRD scale. Notwithstanding this, food corporation
management issues, raw material supplies, and competitiveness of domestic food products still remain burning
problems.
Privatized food processing companies found themselves in the position when they could influence the
prices of raw materials and final products. Not being shareholders to the processing companies, agricultural
producers were in no opportunity to protect their interests. The previously existing normal economic relations
within the food chain were to the largest extent broken up just following the privatization of large companies.
The volume of food processing sharply reduced. Trying to improve the situation, the authorities granted the
agricultural producers with the right to purchase the shares of food processing companies and attempted to
arrange for «more fair» prices of raw materials and decrease the number of intermediaries, but all those
measures did not bring any noticeable results. By 1997 the amount of the industry’s gross product has dropped
almost 2 times as against the 1990 level. The decline was the gravest for the meat and dairy industries. At the
same time the 1997-1998 period was marked by a certain improvement of the situation with the food and
specialized food industries (see Table 1).
Table 1
Food Processing Volumes by Industry for the 1990-1997 Period, per cent of the base-year volume
3
Industry Years
1990 1991 1992 1994 1996 1997
Food 100 91,0 76,4 57,8 51,0 54,6
Food, specialized 100 97,0 86,3 64,0 57,1 57,5
Meat and Dairy 100 87,0 65,2 50,5 36,8 32,5
Fish 100 96,0 77,8 54,7 60,3 59,7
Privatization in the agrarian and food sectors must embrace and harmonize the interests of all
participants in the production chain and restrict the monopoly of large food processing companies at the
internal market of Russia. In 1997 seven Russian privatized agricultural-food enterprises were included in the
list of 200 largest industrial companies, their share in the overall volume of domestic food sales being about
70%. Among 20 Russian industrial companies with the highest labor productivity there are seven food
processing plants. For instance, the volume of sales achieved by «Baltika» Brewery equals US$145 000 per
year per worker.
The years prior to the crisis of 1998 were marked by constant growth of food import from the
countries outside of CIS. Thus, by 1997 the volume of import of vegetable oil, sugar, butter and poultry from
Western countries increased 3,8, 2,5, 2 and 1,5 times, respectively, if compared with the corresponding period
of the previous year. However, the quality of the imported goods was getting worse: more than 40% of the
tested fish products and sausage, 27% of the poultry and more than 50% of the vodka and other alcohol drinks
imported in 1997 did not match with the standards.
Privatization has strengthened the vertical integration of food companies and encouraged the
establishment of dealer networks, regional marketing representations and own raw material base.
The Russian food processing industry has a high rating of investment attractiveness. Four huge
companies – «Baltika» Brewery, «Rossia», «Babayevski» and «Krasni Oktyabr» confectioneries – show the
highest profitability rate in the country (40%). The general situation in the industry is such that the available
                                                            
3 Data taken from4
production capacities are utilized just some 30%. Thus, the rate of utilization of meat production capacities
dropped from 57% in 1992 down to 25% in 1996, that of butter and margarine production capacities
respectively fell from 67% to 29% and from 71% to 40% during the same period. Additional amounts of
investments in the industry could bring about a rise in food production already in the nearest years.
1.2. Privatization of Small Companies
The considerable transformations in the ownership relations that took place in the small business
sector of Russia in the 90’s were connected with the introduction of private land ownership, establishment of
independent farms and development of small enterprises in the food industry.
There are 14 million owners of land and property shares in Russia today. However, the question of
private farmland ownership has no sufficient legal grounding on the federal level, since the State Duma refused
to adopt the submitted Land Code. In spite of this, there are local Laws on Land in force in some Russian
regions, which permit to purchase and sell the agricultural land. Land auctions and rents of land shares are
becoming a usual practice, but any effective market turnover of land has not been set going yet. The existing
multi-layer agricultural system includes collective farms of various types of ownership, independent farms and
personal land plots. The most part of the agricultural land has been formally privatized and is now owned by
agricultural workers. More than 70% of the farmlands are in private or collective ownership. So, we can speak
of a small progress on the way to new land relations in Russia, as a result of which a considerable part of the
formerly collective farms’ land and property has been privatized. However, the progress in land relations
cannot be clearly estimated today, because the mechanism of trade in land has not been constructed yet.
The financial support extended by the state to independent farmers is not sufficient, making the latter
decrease in the number beginning with 1998. The number of newly started independent farms is less than that
of the farms that have seized their activities.
Small business first started to emerge in the agrarian sector in the first years of the agrarian reform. By
the middle of the 90’s the total number of small business representatives reached 800 thousands. However,
after 1994 this number tended to reduce together with the number of small food processing companies, whose
current contribution to the overall amount of the food processing industry’s output is estimated to make up
some 30%.
Food products in Russia are produced by small workshops, mini processing lines and independent
small companies. Big companies are active in implementing the policy of merging small regional plants and
factories, many of which are on the verge of bankruptcy. About 40% of the existing food processing companies
are unprofitable. Most of them are small enterprises, which are still too weak to compete with big specialized
plants in terms of quality of products. In 1996 small companies produced 10% of the total amount of meat
products and almost 30% of that of bread, they contribute certain amounts of dairy, macaroni and confectionery
products, but the technological level of production they apply and qualification of their personnel are lower
than that at big enterprises. As a consequence, the processing they perform is less deep, the assortment of their
products is poor as well as the control over the quality of the products.
However, small agricultural companies have certain advantages: they have their own raw material
base, and lower production costs enable them to set lower prices. Small companies facilitate the development
of competition at the food market. The rate of monopoly in the sphere of food production is on a decline in
some regions, and a slight decrease in the prices of the food products produced by both big and small
companies is observed.5
Another advantage small, well technically equipped food-producing companies have is that they are
more flexible in reaction to consumer demand fluctuations and easier to adjust to seasonal nature of production.
A very important thing is that small companies create additional jobs and improve the social and financial
situation in the area.
The current taxation system, unavailability of cheap credit resources and August’98 events pushed
many small agricultural companies to the bankruptcy. In spite of all the hardships small business can still be
revived in the agrarian sector. The more so, that the Russian government and many regional leaders consider
support to small business one of their urgent tasks.
There is an increase in the number of intermediate marketing and service-providing enterprises
currently taking place in the sphere of small business. According to the official statistics, such enterprises take
almost a half of the Russian small companies’ gross output. However, there also exist many expolar structures
of various kinds, which stay out of the bounds of statistical surveys. Experts believe that no less than 30% of
the Russian economy are controlled by criminal structures. For small agricultural business the percentage is
considerably higher, exceeding 50% in some regions. Thus, the Governor of the Saratov Oblast D.Ayatskov is
sure that as much as 80% of the total amount of financial resources are placed with the shadow economy.
4
Privatization in the agrarian sector is an instrument to stir a fair competition among small companies
operating in the food industry. At the same time small business should enjoy legal and financial support
extended through a special agricultural enterprises support foundation.
Small agricultural business should also be provided with adequate support from the state, which is
essential to reduce its transaction costs and make food products more competitive. In the meantime interference
of numerous intermediaries and administrative control authorities on a good’s way to its final consumer makes
the price of that good increase many times.
EBRD notes that the process of privatization of small companies has been completed in Russia, and
that the owners of such companies are granted with the right to sell their property. This is the only achievement
Russia was awarded 4 points for, while all the rest of the indicators featuring the Russian transitional economy
(5 out of 9) were rated 2. However, 3 points seems a more appropriate rating for the rate of privatization of
small food processing companies in the situation when weak state support or no support at all cause the
independent farms and private processing enterprises to run unprofitable and finally collapse.
Underdevelopment of the present market mechanisms and the lack of natural market restrictions for
various market-related institutions led to that the privatization failed to produce the expected effects. It only
caused a sharp rise in transaction costs and pushed the prices of final food products up too high for almost a
half of the potential buyers to pay. We believe that it would never have happened if the market participants’
ownership rights were adequately protected by the state. And we also think that the situation can still be
improved given that small private companies are permanently provided with sufficient economic,
administrative and legal support from the state.
2. Restructuring of Agricultural Enterprises
The need for restructuring is explained by high percentage of unprofitable companies in the agrarian
sector. Thus, in 1998 the share of unprofitable agricultural and food processing enterprises respectively reached
80 and 40 percent. The principal cause of this situation is the lack of an economically grounded combination of
market-oriented mechanisms of regulation with state support. The system of management on the regional level
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is generally based on administrative methods. As a result of this, unprofitable companies continue to function.
The bankruptcy legislation is very rarely applied. The incomes of directors and many workers of such
companies do not depend on the results of their activities, but are generated in ex-polar economic spheres.
Non-formal relations on all levels within and between the companies and widely practiced barter exchange of
goods and services make it so that most of the loser companies, which will hardly ever be able to pay off of
their debts, continue to operate, instead of being declared bankrupts and included in the restructuring program.
The people in such companies go on working in spite of permanent long delays in the payment of wages.
The Russian agrarian sector is just at the initial stage of restructuring, although the general situation in
Russia in terms of restructuring – according to the EBRD rating – is more advanced. The policy of squeezing
the credits and subsidies implemented in Russia, EBRD experts believe, forces the unsuccessful companies to
restructure. However, the bankruptcy legislation is not always observed, and no efforts are made to close down
large insolvent companies. Meanwhile, restructuring of agricultural enterprises is one of the priorities of the
Russian agrarian policy. Thus, Saratov and a number of other Russian regions will be covered by a program of
restructuring of agricultural companies formulated by Russian economists and their colleagues from the
European Union.
This program is based on the principle of decreasing the budget support and making the methods of
management more efficient. It is projected that large collective farms will be split into independent farms and
that unprofitable farms will be affiliated to successful ones. However, it is not for some economic reasons that
most of the Russian bankrupt collective farms cannot be liquidated, but because there is no opportunity for the
population of the majority of Russian rural areas to find alternative jobs. Restructuring in rural regions always
brings about the necessity to solve serious social problems. In view of this the only program acceptable for
rural areas is the federal program of restructuring consisting of similar programs adopted on the level of
subjects of the Russian Federation.
The core of this federal program is the restructuring of production, services providing, food processing
and marketing organizations by using market-oriented mechanisms. At the same time the program is expected
to aim at the development of the social infrastructure, first and foremost education and medical care.
3.  Liberalization of Prices
The economic reform in Russia began with the overall liberalization of prices, which brings about
such an economic regime that is known to be typical of advanced industrial market-oriented economies.
However, liberalization of prices in such countries is always accompanied by measures taken to remove the
negative consequences of taking no control over the prices.
The overall liberalization of prices, which took place in Russia in 1992, when there were no any
economic means designed to influence the prices and when monopolist companies were the dominating power
in the leading branches of the economy, caused a serious crisis. Five years have passed since the liberalization,
and the foreign experts rated this process 3 points and marked that a considerable progress had been achieved
in relation to the prices of fuel which is currently mostly supplied at market prices. However, it soon turned out
that domestic companies could not sustain in the free-price environment. This is one of the most negative
consequences of the price liberalization, which constantly remind of themselves in both the production and
social spheres.
The agricultural sector suffered the most – the increasing disparity between the prices of industrially
made goods and that of agricultural raw produce was aggravated by economic and administrative restrictions7
imposed on the prices of final products. As it was mentioned already, the result was 80% of agricultural
companies going bankrupt with an almost 80% reduction of the rate of domestic food production, which in turn
led to a substantial increase in food imports.
Liberalization of prices in the agricultural sector should be backed up by subsidies differentiated by
regions and products. It is a general practice in all developed countries that food production always employs a
precise mechanism of harmonization of the effective demand, retail prices, production costs and producers’
revenues. Development of such a mechanism should just be the essence of reforms in the agrarian sector.
4.  External Trade
The foreign experts came to the conclusion that the majority of restrictions imposed on the external
economic connections in Russia had been removed. Indeed, liberalization of external trade crashed all the
export-import barriers, which placed the Russian economy in a rather difficult situation.
The domestic food producers suffered severe losses. When discussing the possibility to remove the
export-import restrictions, agriculture and the related branches are normally viewed as a special case, and strict
economic and administrative measures are usually taken in order to protect the internal food market and
facilitate the export of domestic products. But this is not the case for Russia. The liberalization of external
trade was an unforgivable mistake, the traces of which we are now trying to smooth by imposing import duties
and attempting to promote the exports.
An optimal model of external food trade relations presupposes employment of economically grounded
import tariffs that could make the domestic products stay competitive. That does not mean, of course, that the
internal market should be closed for the rest of the world. But at the same time it is completely inadmissible to
have no any restrictions on the import of food products, the quality of which is almost uncontrolled and often
leaves much to be desired, and to have no state monopoly on trade in alcohol drinks. All these and other
negative features faced at the initial stage of formation of the Russian food market are currently being removed.
In this respect the aim of the government is to protect the domestic commodity producers, ensure adequate
control over the quality of food products and make the trade – especially that in alcohol drinks – more
streamlined. The introduction of the sales tax is one of the measures intended to put the trade organizations
under adequate control.
The Russian external trade acts as a guarantor of firmness of the national currency. In 1992-1997
Russia used to have an active settlement balance and considerable currency reserves, which enabled to maintain
the ruble/dollar exchange rate steady. However, following the crisis, which burst out in August 1998, and the
resulting devaluation of the ruble, the exchange rate shows no trends of getting more or less stabilized and, in
the opinion of many experts, depends upon social and psychological factors rather than on economic ones.
The agricultural system of Russia should be subject to external economic regulation, the methods of
which should differ from that applied to the economy in general. The projected coming of Russia into
GATT/WTO does not mean removal of the majority of tariff barriers for the agriculture and related branches.
None of the countries participating in that international trade organization ever make concessions if there is a
danger that it can negatively affect the domestic agricultural producers’ interests, the situation at the internal
market or limit the access to the world’s food markets. The same principles should be applied when
formulating the external economic agrarian policy of Russia.
5. Competition Policy8
The transition period in Russia brought along legalization of competition. A number of anti-
monopolist laws have been adopted on both the federal and regional levels, and special institutions have been
established with the responsibility to expand the access to the market for companies of all sizes and types of
ownership and to restrict the monopolist position of the leading companies. Unfortunately, it was to the
smallest degree that the legal and institutional promotion of competition involved the agricultural sector of
Russia. The national food market is still governed by large domestic commodity producers and imports. Owing
to the weak competition environment, the prices of food products are artificially kept high, which makes every
regular Russian buyer lose up to 20% of his income.
Another feature that makes the normal access to the market difficult is that most of the Russian
markets are controlled by criminal structures.
At the present time the food market of Russia is in the very beginning of the way to the competition
standards typical of the leading industrial economies. There are no institutions that could effectively facilitate
the development of competition yet, and the majority of small and middle companies still have to face
numerous obstacles on their way to the market. Beside the pressure exerted by the criminal structures
mentioned above, among such obstacles are administrative restrictions imposed on the export of food products
from many Russian regions, quotas and licenses.
However, the state-owned companies operating in some certain sectors of the food market now begin
to regain the positions lost during the reforms, occupying almost 80% of the market for dairy products, for
instance. Such companies can produce and sell larger amounts of perishable products than their foreign
competitors do, and can carry out deeper processing of agricultural products to leave behind their rivals from
the small business sector.
Russian food processing enterprises have certain advantages over the foreign companies, since they
have the opportunity to better react to demand fluctuations, spend less on the transportation and produce
traditional products containing minimum of preservatives and additives.
It is also obvious that large food processing companies are stronger than the small ones in terms of
technological and financial potential and completeness of the technological cycle. In addition to that they are
usually better equipped, have better infrastructures and their own trade marks and are well known at the
market.
There are three principal types of large food processing companies currently dominating at the Russian
food market. The most powerful are the companies of the federal level having their own raw material base and
wide chain of representations in most of the regions and producing high quality products. The companies of the
inter-regional level orient themselves towards the demand in large economic zones – the Volga Region, Siberia
and etc. The companies of this type rule the regional markets and develop by pooling their resources. And,
finally, local non-specialized enterprises occupy their specific niche, adjusting their production to the
peculiarities of the local markets.
Competitiveness of the Russian products at both the domestic and world food markets requires
diversification of production, which would make the food producing companies more flexible and financially
sound.
The experts believe that the competition potential of the Russian food processing industry has not
been exhausted and can even be at least two times increased by implementing an efficient competition strategy
and expanding the sales markets.9
Development of the competition at the Russian markets takes adequate protection of the ownership
and consumers’ rights, observance of the already existing anti-monopoly laws and implementation of a flexible
policy of overcoming the negative market trends.
6. Financial Institutions
6.1. Reform of the Banking System and Liberalization of the Interest Rates
The economic reform in Russia was accompanied by considerable changes in the national banking
practice. There appeared many commercial banks, the entire banking system was reformed, the crediting system
was liberalized and interest rates set free. But unfortunately, the revised banking system was not oriented
towards the real sector of the economy and direct investments. High rates of inflation would make long-term
investments ineffective. Commercial banks would concentrate their efforts on speculations with securities –
mostly promissory notes issued by the state. After the crisis of 1998 large commercial banks found themselves
in no opportunity to repay the foreign credits and release the deposits of the population, let alone the interests.
As a result, Russian commercial banks ran out of credit, although the majority of them continue to struggle for
existence.
It is a widespread point of view in Russia that the domestic commercial banks cannot even be
compared with the banks in developed countries. However, the consequences of the August crisis give a better
understanding of how persistent private capital can be in fighting for its rights. The bankruptcy of Tokobank –
once a «European thermometer for the Russian economy» – can serve as an example. The cause of the
bankruptcy is quite simple – credits without reliable guarantees and huge expenses for internal needs
amounting US$ 10 millions per month. Just these very peculiarities of operation placed the majority of the
Russian banks on the verge of bankruptcy. However, the case with Tokobank shows that there are those who
can protect their interests in Russia by using although imperfect, but already existing legal instruments. During
the four months before the bank was declared bankrupt the temporary administration of Tokobank managed to
return huge financial resources to the bank by winning dozens of claims, holding public promissory note
auctions, returning the obligatory reserve funds from the Central Bank, selling the bank’s shares, evaluating
and putting the buildings and property of the bank on offer and by taking over measures. The bank’s assets
were not embezzled as were the cases with Tveruniversalbank, Kredo-bank and Moscow Inter-regional
Commercial Bank. As a result, Tokobank managed to accumulate the resources sufficient to satisfy the claims
of at least a part of its creditors. The situation is such that the Russian bankers have to learn how to survive.
5
Forced by the government structures, private Russian banks started to extend credits to agricultural
companies on a security of the former. In order to facilitate the process of crediting Agroprombank and regional
commercial agricultural banks were established. Unfortunately, the agricultural companies’ property the banks
had to accept under administrative pressure was, as a rule, unmarketable. As a result, when most of the
agricultural companies – debtors failed to pay off of their debts, many regional banks had to seize their
activities.
Agroprombank owing 9 billion denominated rubles was purchased by the Capital Savings Bank, and
its name was changed into SBS-AGRO. During a number of years the bank was receiving payments from the
agricultural companies – debtors, which were in fact the money allocated from the state budget. Thus, huge
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budget resources did not reach the agricultural producers, which fanned the flames of crisis in the agricultural
sector.
Privileged crediting of the agricultural and industrial complex, the introduction of which was marked
by the allocation of 3 billion rubles from the budget, was first carried out by two banks – SBS-AGRO and
Alfa-bank. However, by 1997-1998 the number of such banks grew up to twelve. Inclusion of commercial
banks in the system of revocable privileged crediting led to a considerable rise in prices of credits, which was
not only a result of participation of intermediaries, but also owing to the strict measures applied to the
companies that failed to repay.
The system of privileged crediting with the participation of commercial banks was not supported by
Russian commodity producers. Some of the latter tried to obtain credits from foreign companies. The Dutch
company «Sebeko» offers credits to vegetable and potato growing companies for the purchase of the whole set
of machinery and equipment. But the Russian agricultural producers usually do not succeed in finding reliable
guarantors, while the obligation to repay the credit in five years is unreal to fulfill for the majority of the
farmers.
We believe that Russian agricultural producers should be supported by the programs similar to the
one that was implemented in the Kolomna Region of the Moscow Oblast in the 1996-1997 period. The
program provided for free allocation of US$ 20 millions from the Dutch budget for the purchase of agricultural
machinery, equipment and seeds to be delivered to Moscow farmers – potato producers. The payments for the
above deliveries were low and were expected to be in kind. Such conditions would be quite acceptable for most
of the Russian farmers.
6.2. Securities Markets and Non-ba nk Financial Institutions
Stock exchanges appeared in Russia in the first years of the economic reform. By the mid 90’s the
necessary environment was created allowing companies in all Russian regions to issue and trade in securities,
and it was in that very period when the first transactions with government securities and promissory notes were
carried out. In 1996-1998 state treasury promissory notes were introduced into the securities market. Non-
banking structures started to emerge – investment foundations, private insurance foundations, non-state
pension funds and leasing companies. Private companies started to issue their own securities. Foreign
commercial banks and private investors began to pay interest to the securities issued by the Russian
government, therefore, the events which took place in August 1998 were a severe blow experienced not only in
Russia, but in the majority of the European countries as well. It was a popular saying in Europe in the
beginning of September that one had to always have an umbrella at hand to shelter himself from the rain
coming from Russia.
Securities, promissory notes and non-bank financial organizations became a common feature of the
Russian agrarian sector more than five years ago. Permanent debts to the federal budget forced the government
structures to arrange for the issue of the so-called «agrarian» bonds with the maturity of 3 years, which were
issued by the subjects of the Russian federation under the pressure from the federal authorities. Several times
the «agrarian» bonds were put up for auction and arouse a certain interest among commercial banks. However,
nothing is reported of what happened to the bonds next.
It is a usual practice today that agricultural companies make payments to their suppliers of industrially
manufactured goods by using promissory notes and tax exemptions. For a number of years commodity credits
were widespread, that means that agricultural producers were supplied with fuel on account of tax payments. In11
order to facilitate the purchase of agricultural machinery special leasing budget funds were established. Now
farmers are often supplied with the inputs they need - fuel, mineral fertilizers and seeds – provided that they
repay in kind after the next harvest at fixed or market prices. Exchange with goods is usually performed in the
agrarian sector today on barter terms.
7. Legal Protection of Investors
Attraction of investments remains a burning problem for all the regions of Russia and all the branches
of the Russian economy. However, there is no any legal base capable of protecting the investors’ interests
created yet. The existing legal provisions are formulated quite vaguely, especially in parts of raising of
investment resources, arrest of securities and repatriation of profits. So, investments in the Russian economy
can only be supported at the present stage by using preliminary legal instruments. Considering attraction of
foreign investments to be of utmost importance, the Russian government declared its deepest concern about the
provision of guarantees to foreign investors, introduction of insurance against risks, adoption and strict
observance of the legal regulations complying with the universally applied international legal standards.
The legal basis for investing in the agricultural and food processing spheres is directly connected with
the development of the land relations and land market, the possibility to use land and property as a mortgage,
and development of the legal instruments applied to protect the land ownership rights. It is a shortcoming that
the land code has not been adopted in Russia so far, and the land relations are regulated by regional laws on
land that vary considerably by the region in terms of acceptance of private land ownership.
The legal base of the agrarian reform requires further improvement. The laws protecting the investors’
rights must be strictly observed, especially in relation to the projects connected with property in land. It is
essential that both the ownership rights and the investors’ interests are adequately controlled and protected.